In re M.R., 135 N.J.
155 (1994)
The
The
1994 New Jersey Supreme Court case of In re M.R., 135 N.J. 155
(1994) considered “whether a developmentally-disabled woman who is generally
incompetent bears the burden of proof that she has the specific capacity to
choose with which of her divorced parents she will live.”
M.R. was a 21-year-old woman with Down syndrome. After
M.R. expressed her desire to move out of her mother’s home and into her
father’s home, her mother instituted a guardianship action. After M.R. had been
found to be “incapable of governing herself and managing her affairs,” her
father appealed the appointment of her mother as guardian, and sought to have
the daughter reside with him. During the
guardianship proceeding, M.R. was represented by a court-appointed attorney.
The issue was whether M.R. had the specific capacity to express her preference
to reside with her father.
At
trial, the lower court had concluded that the father bore the burden of proving
that M.R. retained the specific capacity to decide where she wished to live. On
appeal, however, our Supreme Court concluded that, because her mother was
challenging M.R.’s capacity to decide her place of residence, her mother should
bear the burden of proving that M.R. was specifically incapacitated with
respect to this limited area, by clear and convincing evidence. (Notably, the
As
the
Unless they endanger themselves or others, competent
people ordinarily can choose what they want, even if their choices are
irrational or dangerous. Traditionally, however, courts have tempered the right
of self-determination of incompetent people with concerns for their best
interests. The paradox with incompetent people is to preserve as much as
possible their right of self-determination while discharging the judicial
responsibility to protect their best interests.
With
this in mind, the Court remanded the case back to the Chancery Division, for
reconsideration in light of standards set forth in the Supreme Court opinion.
During
the course of its analysis, the
In
contrasting the role of court-appointed attorney with that of a guardian ad
litem, the
[t]he role of the representative attorney is entirely
different from that of a guardian ad litem. The representative attorney
is a zealous advocate for the wishes of the client. The guardian ad litem
evaluates for himself or herself what is in the best interests of his or her
client-ward and then represent[s] the client-ward in accordance with that
judgment.
The
Ordinarily, an attorney should “abide by [the]
client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation,” R.P.C.
1.2(a), and “act with reasonable diligence ... in representing [the] client,” R.P.C.
1.3. The attorney’s role is not to determine whether the client is competent to
make a decision, but to advocate the decision that the client makes. That role,
however, does not extend to advocating decisions that are patently absurd or
that pose an undue risk of harm to the client.
Thus, while the attorney generally should advocate
the client’s preferences, “upon perceiving a conflict between that person’s
preferences and best interests, the attorney may inform the court of the
possible need for a guardian ad litem.”
The M.R. decision was founded upon the
recognition that,
Advocacy that is diluted by excessive concern for the
client’s best interests would raise troubling questions for attorneys in an
adversarial system. An attorney proceeds without well-defined standards if he
or she forsakes a client’s instructions for the attorney’s perception of the
client’s best interests.